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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude from
evidence scientific expert testimony which is not based
on accepted scientific methods.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. is an association of industrial companies formed for the purpose
of submitting amicus curiae briefs in appellate cases involving significant issues affecting the law of product
liability. Its members include about 100 major manufacturers.
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The National Association of Manufacturers of the
United States of America is a non-profit voluntary business association representing more than 12,000 compa·
nies throughout the United States. NAM is affiliated
with an additional 128,000 businesses through the National Industrial Council and the NAM Associations
Council. NAM members are parties in cases nationwide
and are interested in the fair administration of justice,
which includes the appropriate use of scientific testimony.
The Business Roundtable is an association of the chief
executive officers of approximately 200 of the largest _
companies in the nation. The Roundtable examines public issues that affect the economy and develops positions
that seek to reflect sound economic and social policies.
The Chemical Manufacturers Association is a nonprofit trade association whose member companies produce, market, and use industrial chemicals. Its members
comprise more than 90 percent of the productive capacity
for basic industrial chemicals in the United States.
This casP is of paramount interest to amici because it
illustrates the acute dangers to businesses and to society
posed by the unchecked use of aberrant scientific testimony in the courtroom. While the district and appellate
courts below acted properly in this ~ase to filter out such
testimony, other courts have not been so vigilant. The
predictable result has been that businesses like respondent ha Ye abandoned the develoP.ment of promising innovations and groundbreaking products because of the fear
of unsound science in the courtroom and the enormous
litigation risks this scenario presents. As principal voices
. of the business and manufacturing communities, amici
are well suited to emphasize for the Court the impact
of aberrant expert te~timony on private litigants, and
the need for courts to exercise responsible control over
what is allowed to pass before juries in the guise of
"expert" testimony.
fl-

* Pursuant to Rule :l7. letters of con sent have been filed with
th<: Clerk of the Court.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Judge Learned Hand once made an observation that
goes to the heart of this case:
No one will deny that the law should in some way
effectively use expert knowledge wherever it will aid
in settling disputes. The only question is as to how
it can do so best. 1

Amici submit that the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude expert scientific testimony when it has been
developed without regard for accepted scientific methods.
That is the precise situation in this case.
This case focuses on expert scientific evidence. Such
evidence plays a vital and often dispositive role in modern litigation. For scientific evidence to be helpful to
the factfinder it must meet some minimal threshold of
reliability. To hold otherwise would be to allow a system
of adjudication based more on chance than on reason.
An essential element of our system of dispute resolution is the principle that judgments reached in accordance
with reliable evidence will promote accuracy and avoid
mere speculation. The putative expert who offers to testify about issues of science without regard to the scientific method imperils the very foundation of rational
decision-making. It is neither practical nor sufficient to
rely on the give-and-take of cross examination to correct
for expert scientific evidence offered without sound foundation. Indeed, admitting the testimony of experts whose
methodology falls well outside the scientific mainstream
undermines faith in our system of justice, deters investment in new technologies, and results in unwarranted
judp.ments. This proceeding presents a chief case in
point: respondent ceased distributing domestically the
drug Bendectin in order to curb litigation expenses assoLearned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations R egarding E:rpert Tt> stim'lny, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 40 (1902).
1
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ciated with that product, even though study upon study
has now concluded that the attack on Bendectin was
scientifically unfounded.
Amici believe that a rational system of dispute resolu-

tion requires that federal courts exercise their express
authority under the Federal Rules of Evidence to scrutinize and monitor the quality of expert testimony, especially where, as here, that testimony is at odds with a
rich and voluminous body of scientific literature. Amici
support fully the development of innovative science, and
believe that the Rules must be construed so as to impose
standards for expert testimony which are not so high as
to stifle this development, but not so low as to permit
the introduction of aberrant science in the courtroom.
The federal courts should use reliable science to help
resolve legal disputes; they should not be asked to rewrite
science.
In keeping with this Court's rules on amicus practice,
this brief will not address issues that have been or are
likely to be raised by the briefs of the parties or other
amici, but will focus instead on four matters pertinent to
this case but not likely to be fully addressed elsewhere.
Part I demonstrates that experts have historically been
afforded uncommonly wide testimonial latitude, and that
this latitude has historically and necessarily been circumscribed by a series of "gateways," reaffirmed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which protect the judicial process
and ensure rational decision-making. Part II refutes
petitioners' suggestion that the "adversarial system"and, in particular, the availability of cross-examinationis an adequate check on unsound expert testimony, and
the related contention that the Federal Rules of Evidence
reflect a congressional determination to substitute the
adversarial system for the courts' historic responsibility
to determine whether a particular expert may testify at
all. Part III explains why petitioners' attempted comparison between the use of scientific evidence in the ad-
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ministrative context and in the co,1rts is flawed. Finally,
Part IV explains that the courts below correctly excluded
petitioners' proffered "scientific" testimony because under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, such testimony must be
developed according to the scientifi~ method.
ARGUMENT
I. OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM VESTS SUBSTANTIAL

RESPONSIBILITY IN THE COURTS TO CIRCUMSCRIBE EXPERT TESTIMONY

Petitioners have brought this case cl iming that the
Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted
"limit judi<'ial
creativity" (Petitioners1 Brief at 25), and to leave courts
with little or no authority to fcashion or apply guidelines
as may be necessary to ch~u~inscribe expert testimony.
As shown below, petitioner~-~ i '.b ;(n } of a neutered judiciary, forced to indulge me t an.'l' e~pert tes.timony, ignores the wide latitude historicaily afforded experts in
our judicial system. The vast !:le.ope of this latitude is
shown in Part A below. This latitude has in tut:r n fostered checks or "gateways" which logically and i:i.istorically have been found necessary to limit such testimony.
Part B shows that these limits are embodied in th'¥ Federal Rules of Evidence.

t,

A. Experts Are Afforded Testimonial Latitude Well
Beyond That Afforded Lay Witnesses

Petitioners' analysis initially fails to take account of
the extraordinary latitude afforded experts in our scheme
of justice. In critical respects, experts, despite their central role in modern litigation, are freed from the substantial constraints imposed on their lay counterparts.
1. Experts are Free to Render Opinions Not Based on
Firsthmul I<.1wwledge. The rule that experts are free to
render opinion-: based on other than firsthand knowledge
has long distinguished expert from lay testimony. One of
the earliest rules of excl 1-1sion at common law held that

6

witnesses could only testify as to matters within their
personal knowledge. 2 An early scholar summarized the
state of the law on this point:
A witness examined as to facts ought to state those
only of which he has had personal knowledge . . . .
It has been said that a witness must not be examined
in chief as to his belief or persuasion, but only as to
his knowledge of the fact . . . . As far as regards
mere belief or persuasion which does not rest upon a
sufficient and legal foundation, this position is cc,rrect,-as where a man believes a fact to be true
merely because he has heard it said to be so.
Thomas Starkie, Evidence 173 ( 1824) . In essence, then,
the so-called "opinion rule" originated as a rule that
precluded witnesses from testifying about matters about
which they had no knowledge or personal acquaintance.
It was, in effect, a "gateway" that precluded certain
individuals from testifying at all, or, in Wigmore's words,
"merely a recognition of an otherwise established general
principle of testimonial qualifications that the witness, to
be competent at all, must have personal observation. Had
the matter gone no farther, there would have been no
separate 'opinion rule,' but merely a special application
of an ordinary principle of testimonial competency." 7
John H. Wigmore, Emdence in Trials at Common Law
§ 1917, at 3 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (citations omitted).
This principle finds full expre8sion in Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits an expert to
"testify . . . in the form of an opinion or otherwise,"
and in Rule 703, which permits experts to testify based
on information which is simply "made known" to the
expert "at or before the hearing." By contrast, Rule 701
continues to require that the opinion of a lay witness be
"based on the perception of the witness" and be "helpful
to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony."
2

This was also a general rule of civil and canon law. See William
S. Holdsworth, 9 A History of English Law 211 n.4 (1926) .
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2. Experts Can Testify About Otherwise Inadmissible
Hearsay. The evidentiary rule most frequently associated
with the AnglerArnerican system is the ban on most
forms of hearsay testimony. 3 The modern rule, as embodied in Rule 802, is premised on the notion that such
evidence is inhE:rently untrustworthy, in large part because it is not amenable to cross-examination.
In salient respects, however, this rule does not apply
to experts. For instance, Federal Rule 803 ( 18) permits
experts to testify about statements contained in published
works that are established to be reliable authorities. And
Rule 703 permits an expe1't to :. :' 3e an opinion on facts
or data thJt may otherwise bt :.i1aclmissible if they are of
a type ren :ona· '. y relied upun by experts in the particular
field.
3. E ~'Cr· · ~ Can Res'Fond to Hypothetical Questions.
At co: :r;_18 n .:: w and under the Federal Rules, only experts tre rJermitted to respond to hypothetical questions.
2 Wigmore, su'{lla, s 67U. Prior to enactment of the
Federal Rules, howeYer, f-Jme courts had required that a
hypothetical question (J , include all relevant facts, (2 )
omit any facts that were not supported or not likely to
be supported by evidence before the trier of fact, and
(3) be stated i_n open court. Charles T. McCormick,
McCormick on EV'idence § 14, at 37-38 (Edward W.
Cleary et al. eds. 1 3d ed. 1984) ; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 552
( 1964). The Federal Rules liberalized the restrictions on
hypothetical questions which may be asked of an expert.
'I'he combination of Rules 702, 703 and 705 enables counsel to ask hypothetical questions that incorporate facts or
Even before there was a generalized rule excluding hearsay,
such evidence was viewed as inferior. The push toward adoption of
a rule excluding hearsay came in part from a number of celebrated
trials during the early sixteenth century in which obvious injustice
was wrought by reliance on hearsay. See generally Richard 0.
Lempert & Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence
(2d ed. 1983).
3
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data not actually-in evidence, and which need not be disclosed during examination; they can be given to the
expert in the secrecy of the office of the counsel who will
present him.
4. Experts Can Testify About Ultimate Issues. Both
the power, and potential danger, of expert testimony lie
in large part in the expert's authority to draw conclusions concerning ultimate issues to be decided by the jury.
The fact that such testimony arguably invades the province of the factfinder once led many states to exclude such
expert opinions in their state court systems. McCormick
on Evidence, supra, § 12, at 30. The Federal Rules, by
contrast, expressly allow testimony on ultimate issues,
save in criminal actions where defendant's mental state is
an ultimate issue. See Fed. R. Evid. 704."
As shown by these examples-of which there are
others 5-many of the fundamental rules of exclusion
that promote the reliability of evidence simply do not
pertain to experts, notwithstanding that their status in
litigation commonly makes experts "as often skillful and
effective in producing obscurity and error, as in the elucidation of truth." McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. (20
How. ) 402,409 (1857) (Daniels, J., dissenting).

Federal Rule 704 applies to lay opinions as well as expert opinions. However, lay opinions are governed by the constraint set
forth in Rule 701, requiring personal knowledge, and therefore are
less likely to be admitted than expert opinions on the ultimate
issue.
4

For instance, experts also are not required to disclose during
direct examination the facts or data underlying their opinions (Fed.
R. Evid. 705), and can testify about matters that they learn from
other witnesses during trial ( Fed. R. Evid. 703).
5
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B. The Federal Rules Of Evidence Reimpose Certain
Historic Gateways As Necessary Checks On Expert
Testimony

Given the extraordinary latitude traditionally afforded
expert witnesses, courts and commentators have long recognized the need to impose "gateways" through which
expert testimony must pass for it to be considered us~ful,
and ultimately admissible, at trial. At the same time, it
has never been thought that any single mechanism could
be counted on to rein in expert evidence and curb unsound expert practices. Rather, courts have relied o_n
the fashioning of appropriate principles governing the
proper use of expert testimony, coupled with the trial
court's exerci~e of its historic discretion to control the
conduct of trials and to see to the proper and fair administration of justice. The so-called Frye test is a natural outgrowth of this legacy. See Paul Giannelli, The
AdrnU:isibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
Unite<l States, A Half CentunJ Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev.
1197 (1980).
Far from renouncin~ this legacy-as petitioners suggest-the Federal Rules of Evidence support and reaffirm
it. At the heart of the Federal Rules lies the proposition
that the federal courts have both the authority and responsibility to employ rules of exclusion and evidentiary
limitations to promote the reliability of testimony,
whether Jay or expert, all to "the end that the truth may
be ascertained and rthe l proceedings justly determined."
Fed R. Evid. 102. The Federal Rules thus outline a
series of "gateways" through which proper expert testimony must pass, and which togethe1· are intended to assist
courts in distinguishing the useful from the useles$, the
meaningful from the misleading, and the probative from
the prejudicial expert testimony.
In particular, the gateways embodied in Rule 702
1 permitting scientific testimony only if it is based on
"scientific . . . knowledge [that) will assist the trier of
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fact") , Rule 703 ( requiring that the underpinnings of an
expert's opinion be "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject" t , Rule 704 ( requiring that
opinions on the ultimate issue be "otherwise admissible") ,
and Rule 403 (excluding relevant testimony if it will,
among other things, mislead the jury) provide a flexible
yet cohesive scheme for "filtering out" expert opinions
which are not firmly rooted in appropriate methodology
-which, in the case of scientific testimony, means opinions not rooted in the scientific method. Simply stated,
an expert's opinion on an issue of science which is developed without regard to the scientific method cannot con.stitute "scientific" knowledge within the meaning of Rule
702, and therefore can only "mislead[]," "confus [el,"
and "prejudice" the factfinder as those terms are used
in Rule 403. Evidence which appears to be scientifically
objective, but which in reality is not, cannot "assist the
trier of fact" as Rule 702 requires. The Ninth Circuit
properly applied such constraints on expert testimony in
excluding petitioners' scientific testimony~
II. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE NEITHER
REQUIRE NOR PERMIT COURTS TO ABDICATE
THEIR HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY TO CIRCUMSCRIBE EXPERT TESTIMONY

Petitioners suggest that the Federal Rules of Evidence
reflect a determination by Congress- to "let it all in"that is, to impose few if any constraints on the admissibility of expe1-t testimony in the first instance, and to
rely on the adversarial system for weeding out unsound
scientific testimony and methodology. Petitioners' Brief
at 15, 39-40. This view reflects not only a misreading
of the terms and spirit of the Federal Rules, but a
naive assessment of the potency of unsound scientific evidence in the courtroom.
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A. Cross-Examination Is Not A Meaningful Substitute
For Judicial Scrutiny

Fe_w would deny that in many situations, cross-examination is an effective constraint on aberrant testimony.
Effective cross-examination, however, presupposes that
the jury will be able to understand the testimony and
thus appreciate the weaknesses made evident during crossexamination.0 There is no such presupposition in the
context of expert te:;timony. To the contrary, the very
reason for permitting expert testimony in the first place
suggests that lay factfinders may not be able to fully
comprehend and evaluate the testimony before them. This
inability to fully appreciate scientific evidence can arise
even in relatively straightforward cases, and can often
lead a factfinder to embrace the fallacy that because one
development follows another, the two are causally
related.7
Concern over the ability of lay factfinders to fully comprehend complex expert evidence is not new. Learnect
Hand astutely highlighted the conundrum when he wrote:
Effective cross-examination also presupposes that attorneys will
have ample opportunity to take discovery sufficient to conduct
effective cross-examination. Yet federal discovery rules substantially restrict the opportunities and methods for discovering experts. Furthermore, rec~nt amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure curtail the ability of parties to fully discover each
other's experts. See Paul F. Rothstein, The Collision Between New
Discovery Amendments and Expert Testimony Rules, Litigation,
Spring 1988, at 17. And, of course, in criminal cases there is
virtually no discovery .
6

7

With such post hoc reasoning, one concludes that because event

A preceded event B, it must have caused event B. For example,

we may see an eclipse of the sun. We then beat on a drum. The
eclipse disappears and the sun is restored. We conclude that beating the drum caused the sun to reappear. Alvan R. Feinstein,
Clinical Epidemiology: The Architecture of Clinical Research 4142 ( 1985) . Scientific research is designed to avoid the post hoc
fallacy.
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The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury,
not facts, as we have seen, but general truths derived
from his specialized experience. But how can the
Jury judge between two statements each founded
upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to
their own? It is just because they are incompetent
for such a task that the expert is necessary at aU.
Learned Hand, Hist<mcal and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimany, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 54 (1902).
This concern is all the more warranted as science-driven
disputes increasingly wend their way through the federal
courts. The burden on jurors is especially acute where,
as here, they are asked to determine causation based on
a reanalysis of epidemiological data culled a.d hoc from a
variety of previously published studies all of which point
in the direction of no causation. 8
s In a sobering study, Dr. Molly Treadway Johnson, now of the
Federal Judicial Center, sought to determine experimentally the
ability of lay jurors to comprehend epidemiological evidence bearing
on causation. Molly Treadway, An Investigation. of Juror Comprehension of Statistical Proof of CaUBation (1990) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University). In one experiment,
25 jurors who had been called for jury duty in Baltimore state
court were shown two sets of epidemiological data and were asked
to answer four questions about those data (e.g., whether the results
of the study indicate that being exposed to a given substance increases a person's risk of developing a certain abnormality). Out
of 100 yes-no responses, only 41 were correct and only two subjects
( or eight percent) answered all four questions correctly. In short,
subjecte performed worse than chance. In a second experiment,
Dr. Johnson exposed one group of 30 jurors to a videotaped, simulated deposition in which an epidemiologist was being questioned
by a lawyer. The tape was designed to teach the jurors how to use
epidemiological information. A second group of 15 jurors was not
shown the tape. Overall, only three subjects answered all four
questions correctly. Dr. Johnson found that "there was no difference . . . between the expert and no-expert groups in terms of the
number of subjects who used a correct approach at least once." Id.
at 82-83. "It appears, then, that the expert testimony did not pro-
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Beyond the jury's lack of competence in many circumstances to evaluate the success of cross-examination, the
very mystique of science is such that its admission alone
may prejudice the opponent's opportunity for a fair trial
beyond the curative powers of cross-examination. Even
staunch advocates of the "let it all in" approach, such as
Professor Tribe, acknowledge that
th~ very mystery that surrounds mathematical arguments-the relative obscurity that makes them at
once impenetrable by the layman and impressive to
him-creates a continuing risk that he will give such
arguments a credence they may not deserve and a
weight they cannot logically claim.
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1334
<19711.9
This is only to acknowledge that scientific
studies have an inherent aura about them which, if not
properly checked, can "assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen," United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974!,
vide subjects with an understanding of how to analyze and interpret
epidemiological data." Id. at 83. She concluded that
[t]he results of Experiments 1 and 2 paint a rather dismal picture of lay jurors· abilities to understand epidemiological
analysis. Subjects began with a poor understanding of epidemiological reasoning, and apparently were not helped when
provided with expert testimony. Thus, the initial question of
whether lay jurors are generally capable of understanding
statistical proof of causation as it is presented under the current system must be answered in the negative.
Id. at 88.
Professor Tribe was writing in part about People i·. Collins,
438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968), where the California Supreme Court,
in reversing a conviction ba:-1ed on the erroneous mathematical reasoning of an expert witness, warned that " [ m] a thematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society, while assisting the trier
of fact in the search for truth, must not l:ast a spell over him."
0
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with the result that jury decisions may clash with "generally accepted scientific understandings." Note, A Questi <m of Competence : The Judicial Role in the Regulat i<m of Pharmaceuticals, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 773, 780
(1990 ) .

Furthermore, the rigid "let it all in" philosophy espoused by petitioners would impose enormous costs on
society, on parties to litigation, and on our system of
justice. When no or unduly low standards on expert participation are imposed in the first instance, the testimony
that results will often be of little or no evidentiary value,
yet may still consume vast amounts of the courts' and
the parties' resources. See Winan.s v. New York & Erie
R.R. Co. , 62 U.S. 121 How. ) 88, 101 (1858 ). Moreover,
excessive leniency in permitting the introduction into
court of "science," however dubious its methodology,
leads companies to question the wisdom of carrying on
with the development of novel products which may invite
courtroom attack.
If jurors have difficulty understanding epidemiological
and other scientific evidence, it is unrealistic to presume
that cross-examination, no matter how skillfully conducted, can remedy the use of unsound expert evidence.
In such a setting, the imposition of reasonable gateways
is imperative.
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence Neither Require
Nor Countenance Slavish Reliance On The Adver·
sarial System To Weed Out Unsound Expert Testimony

The position embraced by petitioners not only overstates the efficacy of the adversarial system in weeding
out unsound expert evidence, but reflects a misreading
of the Federal Rules. In particular, this view is in error
because it reads the Rules piecemeal and out of context,
rather than as a matrix of interdependent rules of exclusion. The Advisory Committee notes make clear that
Congress envisioned that the courts would apply the
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Rules not in isolation but as a cohesive code. Thus, in
introducing Rule 704 permitting opinion testimony l)n
ultimate issues, the Committee noted:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower
the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rults 701
and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact,
and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence
which wastes time. These provisions afford ample
assurances against the admission of opinions which
would merely tell the jury what result to reach ....
They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria.
In practice, federal courts have applied the Federal Rules
of Evidence as a code, mindful of its conceptual unity. 10
The "let it all in" approach also overlooks the express
mandate that the Rules be construed so as to "secure fairness in ad 11inistration" and "elimination of unjustifiable
expense ar d delay." Fed. R. Evid. 102. As noted above,
unjustifieo expense and delay would be the predictable
result were the Federal Rules construed, as petitioners
suggest, to eliminate the authority of trial courts to apply rules of exclusion so as to filter out "misleading"
evidence of no "assist [ance J" to the trier of fact.

See, e.g., United Statn v. ScMtzle, 901 F .2d 252, 257 (2d Cir.
1990) ("[a]lthough the Federal Rules of Evidence do not bar
all expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue . . . a district
court may exclude ultimate issue testimony under Federal Ruic of
Evidence 702 when it is not helpful to the jury, or under Rule 403
when it may be unduly prejudicial"); United States v. Scavo, 5!)3
F .2d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 1979) ; United St.ates v. Brown, 776 F .2d
:397, 401 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986) (though
expert testimony was not barred by Rule 704(b), "district judges
should heed the Advisory Committee's ~ote to Rule 704" and also
consider other "precautionary observations about the admission
of [expert) testimony").
10
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III. PETITIONERS' ANALOGY TO THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IS UNTENABLE

Petitioners and certain amici challenge the conclusion
of the Ninth Circuit because various federal agencies are
willing to take regulatory action based on unpublished
scientific research or in the absence of positive epidemiological studies. See, e.g., Petitioners' Brief at 12 n.39:
Brief of Amici Curiae of Physicians, Scientists and Historians of Science in Support of Petitioners at 18; Brief
of Amici Curiae American Society of Law, Medicine and
Ethics et al. at 10. In fact, the actions of federal regulatory agencies are not germane to the issues raised in
this case for several reasons.
First, if procedures used by those agencies to assess
risks were applied here, petitioners' claims would vanish.
Simply stated, the United States Food and Drug Administration, the premier agency in assessing the safety and
efficacy of drugs, has already determined that Bendectin
is "safe" and "effective." See Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act § 505 (b), 21 U.S.C. § 355 ( b) tl988, (setting forth prerequisites for FDA approval).
Moreover, petitioners overlook the differences between
administrative "risk assessment" and judicial factfinding.
Administrative action is aimed at regulating future conduct. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488
U.S. 204, 208 11988 l. The statutory missions of federal
agencies include apprising the public of perceived future
risks and setting standards to reduce such risks. For example, the National Toxicology Program lists a substance in the Annual Report on Carcinogens if that substance is "reasonably ... anticipated to be [aJ carcinogen [] ." Public Health Service Act § 3011 b 1 , 4 1, 42
U.S.C. § 241 I b) , 4 1 11988,. The purpose of the Annual Report is risk identification, not resource realloca-
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tion. 11 However, the Program's listing does not penalize
a manufacturer for past conduct. Regulatory action can
be triggered even in the absence of an established causeand-effect relationship. In sharp contrast, tort litigation
judges past conduct, and shifts resources only where that
past conduct actually caused the plaintiff's injuries.
In addition, the gateways so essential to the trial process for ensuring reasoned and consistent decision-making
are not nearly as critical in the regulatory process. Unlike jurors, those making regulatory decisions often deal
with scientific issues as part of th~ir job, and are able to
fully evaluate such evidence and ascertain potential
risks. Moreover, since the decisions reached by -agencies govern entire enterprises or lines of commerce, consistency is better assured. And finally, administrative
agencies are expressly authorized to consider evidence
that would ordinarily not be admissible in a court of
law. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556 <d)
<1988 I I " [a] ny oral or documentary evidence may be
received" in administrative proceedings) ; Richardsoo v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971) ; McC<Yrm,ick oo Evide_nce, supra, ~ 352, at 1009 (" [a] dministrative agencies generally are not restricted in the kind of evidence
they can admit") .
In short, while one can draw meaningful lessons from
the actions of administrative agencies that might be of
As such. a substance ·•:ill be listed by the National Toxicology
Program in the Annual Report even though there is no evidence of
a cause-and-effect relationship between it and cancer; a mere association in animal studies will in the agency's view suffice. See Public
Health Ser\'ice, U.S. Dept. H.H.S., Sixth Annual Report on Carcinoge1L-1 \'iii (1991) . It bears noting that in spite of the Program's
low threshold, " [ o] nly substances for which the evidence of carcinogenicity has been peer-reviewed are evaluated for possible inclusion in the Annual Reports." Id. There is doubt, even within
the agency. that this low threshold is consistent with the Pro~ram's statutory mandate. See gPnerally Final Report of the Ad\·i~ory Re\'iew by thl' National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific Counselors, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,721 (1992).
11

\
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some use in the context of private litigation, the analogy
pressed by petition~rti goes too far. Administrative action is prophylactic and n,,t retrospective; its purpose is
to warn of pouible health effects and not to judge
whether a given agent in fact caused a specified ailment.
Administrative action iu the health sciences is undertaken by trained professionals pursuant to a statutory
mandate, not by jurists and jurors. And administrative
agencies, unlike federal courts, are not bound by the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
What petitioners ultimately fr ·· to acknowledge, then,
is that legal systems fulfill a number of salutary purJ>OM!. They provide a socially acceptable means of resolving disput8, and lend a degree of certainty essential if
people and enterprises are to invest in ideas and products.
Fostering certainty, a fundamental goal of the AngloAmerican system, is possible only where the rules that
guide judicial decision-makers comport with those that
guide responsible decision-makers in the private sector.
Products developed through experimentation according to
the rigors of the scientific method can be fairly judged
only in light of that same method.
Petitioners' attempt to equate administrative and judicial action also obscures the fact that to condone tort
liability based on opinions developed without regard to
the scientific method increases uncertainty and, correspondingly, poses a significant disincentive to the development of new products. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages Versus New Prod,.
ucts, 246 Science 1395, 1397 <19891 ("inhibiting effect
of expanded product liability may ~rmeate a firm's entire decision-making process" I. This problem is particularly acute in the health care sector, where drug manufacturers
might be reluctant to undertake re~earch program~
to develop some pharmaceuticals that would pro\"e
beneficial or to distribute others that are available to
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be marketed, because of the fear of large adverse
monetary judgments. Further, the additional expense
of insuring against such liability-assuming inst11·ance would be available--and of research programs
to reveal possible dangers not detectable by available
scientific methods could place the cost of medication
beyond the reach of those who need it most.

Brown v. Superior Cuurt ( Abbott Laboratories), 751
P:2d 470, 479· <Cal. 1988) (highlighting examples · In
1
which drugs a nd vaccines were withdrawn or not introduced because of liability concerns) . In this regard, too,
it is important to distinguish evidentia'ry rules. that e:Xcl ude aberrant testimony 'when judging 'past" conduct froin
those rules used by administrative agencies in regulating
future conduct.
IV. SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY MUST BE DE·
. VELOPED IN AcCbRD wrtii .THE' SCIEN'i'ItIC

ME'l'BdD

' ) .'

.

I

•

This case shows the perils of unchecked expert testimony in the context of complex scientific evidence. For
instance, the dangers inherent · in permitti'ng experts 'to
offer opinions on ultimate issues were exemplified by the
expert affidavits submitted to the district court by petitioners, which are rife with opinions about ultiinate
issues. Thus, Dr. John Palmer, although having never
examined the Daubert or Schuller children or their
mothers, nonetheless stated in his affidavit that "it is my
opinion . . . that in each case the · drug Bendectin was
taken at the period of time such as tt> effect [sic] the
cells that would produce the normal limb structure 1nd
that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each . of the
children." J.A. 192. Such a conclusion, given its "scientific" underpinnings, is "likely to be shrouded with an
aura of near infallibility, akin to the ·a ncient oracle of
Delphi" 1United States i·. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168
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(8th Cir. 1975, , , particularly given the jurors' predictable lack of facility for scientific information. 12
Likewise, the rule permitting experts to answer hypothetical questions increases the likelihood that jurors will
accept as true those "facts" that have been artfully incorporated into the question even though the!e is no
evidentiary basis for accepting their validity. 13 This concern too was borne out in the case below when one of
petitioners' experts, Dr. Swan, testified about "Type II
errors" and concluded erroneously that there is an association between Bendectin and limb reductions. 14 Petitioners summarized her testimony as follows:
u In fact, one study revealed that 70 percent of attorneys and
judges surveyed believed that juries -accord scientific evidence more
credibility than other evidence. Michael J. Saks & Richard Van
Duizend, The Uae of Scientific Evidence in Litigation 5-6 (1983)
(citing results of 0. Schroeder, The Foremic Science, in American
Criminal JU11tu:e: A Legal Stud11 Coneerning the Foremic Sciences
Personnel (Forensic Sciences Foundation n.d.) ) .

This is of more than hypothetical concern : a substantial body
of literature suggests that individuals are influenced by information embedded in questions. In one study, subjects were shown a
film of an automobile accident. Some were asked: "How fast was
the white sports car going when it passed the barn while traveling
along the country road?" No barn existed. Other subjects were
asked the control question: "How fast was the white sports car
going while traveling along the country road?" Subjects in the first
group were significc1ntly more likely to indicate the presence of the
non-existent "barn" during follow-up questioning than were imbjects in the second group. ·Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Malleability
of Human Mem ory, 67 Am. Scientist 312, 312 (1979 ). See Elizabeth F . Loftus & David G. Miller, Semantic Integration of Verbal
Information into a Vi&ual Memo7'JI, 4 J. Exp. Psycho!. 19 (1978);
G.R. Potts, Int egrating Neu: and Old Information, 16 J. Verb.
uarniJig & \'erb. Behav. 305 (1977); Elizabeth F. Loftu~. Leading
Quc.~tion.~ and the Eyeu·itness Report, 7 Cognitive Psychol. 560
<1975); Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of
Automobile Destruction : An Example of th e Int eraction Bf'tu:een
Language and .llem,,ry, 13 J . Verb. Learning & Verb. Behav. 585
13

<1974 ).

Epidemiologic studi es involve consideration of two statistical
possibilities : stating that a relationship exists when in fact it
14
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Dr. Swan calculated the risk of Type II error from
the Bendectin studies and found, as to each study,
that even if Bendectin were ca:using a doubling of
the incidence of human li1nb reducti<>M there was
less than a 20 % chance that the study would yield
a "statistically significant" outcome if "significance"
was lsic] defined as confidence at the 05% level.
Petitioners' Brief at 9-10 (footnote omitted). What petitioners neglect to note is that in order to calculate the
probability of a Type II error one must assume an alternate hypothesis. See B.J. Winer, Statistical Principles in
EzperimenJ,al Detrign 11-14 (2d ed. 1971); Leonard M.
Horowitz, El.ementA of Statistics /<Yr Pll'/Jclwlogy ·and Educaticm 243-50 (1974). Thus, Dr. Swan aaBUmed for purposes of her calculation that Bendectin doubl.ed the risk
of limb reductions. There is literally no evidence in the
record, or anywhere else for that matter, that supports
Dr. Swan's alternate hypothesis, i.e., a doubling of the
risk. Thus, while her testimony appears on its face
to be highly probative, it in fact lacks evidentiary value. 10
does not (Type I error), and failing to observe a relationship when
, one actually exists (Type II error). In the Bendectin studies, a
Type I error occurs if a researcher erroneously concludes that
Bendectin is associated with limb reductions, when in fact no relationship exists. In contrast, a Type II error is committed if the
researcher concludes that there is no relationship between the drug
and limb reductions when one actually exists.
As the Group of American Law Professors noted in their
amicua curiae brief (at 22), "science subjects theories, hypotheses
and common ~ense to systematic test." Dr. Swan's alternate hypothesis fails that test. If Bendectin in fact increased the risk of
limb reductions by a factor of two and if, as a result, the probability of there being a Type II error were 80 percent, then one
would expect that of the ten epidemiological studies dealing with
limb reductions, eight w;,uld show a statistically significant association. In fact, none did. The probability that none would show a
statistically significant association, given Dr. Swan's alternate
hypothesis, is less than eleven percent. Dr. Swan also appeared
to ignore one study in which researchers, after finding no associa111
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In these and other respects, the Bendectin litigation
shows what can go wrong when courts do not impose
sufficient "gateways" governing the introduction of scientific expert testimony. The gateways embodied in the
Federal Rules provide a series of threshold tests against
which such scientific opinion must be measured. These
tests have their roots both in the language of the··Federal
Rules and in the scientific method. We submit that the
tenets of the scientific method articulate what amounts to
a minimum universal standard against which all putative
scientific opinion should be judged, a common denominator linking t~e Frye test and its various adaptations.
Opinion as to an ultimate fact developed without regard to the scientific method doe& not qualify as "scientific knowledge" as that term is uled in Rule '102. Since
it would not be relied upon by scientist& in the field, it
would not "assist the trier of fact" as required by Rule
702, or be said to be baled on data or methodology
"reasonably relied upon" by those in the field as required by Rule 703. Furthermore, since an opinion developed without regard to the scientific method appears to
have scientific authority that it in fM.-t does :,ot have, .
it is "misleading" and "prejudic [ ial]" within the meaning of Rule 403. This does not mean -that novel scientific
findings that di\'erge from accepted notions ought to be
rejected. The scientific method does not denigrate novel
results even where they may clash with commonly held
beliefs. The scientific method speaks to the process by
which the scientist reached a conclusion, not to the conclusion itself, thereby ensuring the orderly growth of
knowledge. As such, the scientific method and the philosophy underlying the Federal Rule8 are both premised
tion between Beudectin and limb reductions, stated that there was
only an 1~ percent chance of missing a two-fold increased risk to
Bendectin-users, i.t:., the probability of a Type II error for the
study was 18 percent. S. Morelock et al ., Hendee-tin and Fetal Developme-nt: A Study flt Boston City Hospital, 142 Am. J . Obstet.
& Gynecol. 209,212 ( 1982).
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ultimately on the same objective: the efficient search for
truth. See Fed R. Evid. 102.
In particular, the scientific method 111 requires that one
(1) first set forth a hypothesis, 17 ( 2) design an experiment, or more properly a set of experiments, to test the
hypothesis,1 11 ( 3) conduct the experiment, collect the
data, and then analyze those data, (4, publish the results
so that they may not only add to the body of knowledge,
but also be subject to external scrutiny, 19 and (5) ensure
that those results are replicable and verifiable.'°
When judged against these standards, petitioners' proffered expert testimony fails to measure up. Petitioners
did not negate the hypothesis that there is no association
between Bendectin and limb reductions; did not establish any alternate hypothesis in accord with the scientific method; did not publish their work for proper peer
review ; and otherwise did not adhere to standard scientific methodology. Indeed, petitioners did little more than
1•

The rudiments of the scientific method derive from the work
of Bacon, Galileo and Newton. Sl'e Eman McMullin, The Dev~lopment of Philosophy of Scieme 1600-1900, Companion to the History
of Modem Science 816 (R.C. Olby et al. eds., 1990). The pioneering
work of British statistician Sir Ronald A. Fisher underlies the
design of scientific experiments more generally. See Ronald A.
Fisher, The De1ign of Erpnifflfflts 11-26_ (8th ed. 1966).

Su Martin Goldstein & Inge F. Goldstein, How We Knnw:
An Erplorntion of the Scientific Proc,·RB 19 (1978).
17

ui Ser Francisco ,J . Ayala & Bert Black, The NaturP of Scirnce
nnd tltr Probleni of Dtmarcation, 1 Science and Courts 1 <forthc·oming 1993).

Ser g,me,-nlly John M. Ziman, Reliabl" Knou·L,,dg": An EJ·plorn.firm of th,· Grounds for Bl'li,f in Srif'?lu <19781. Cf. Prnplr t•.
r.ollin.<J, 405 N.Y.8.2d :l65, !169 c Sup. Ct. 1978) <new theories must
lw "ksted in thl' crucible of controlled experimentation and study,"
a procedure that requires "replication of original experimentf'I. and
scrutiny of the results in variou~ scientific journals").
111

:?o

Sn Karl R. Popper, Th,: Logic of Scientific Discovny 44-45,

5:1-54 (rev. ed. 1972).
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criticize the work of other scientists. But critiquing
another's study does not validate one's own. Yet, under
petitioners' conception of a shackled judiciary, such testimony-though it does not qualify as "scientific knowledge" capable of supporting their burden of proofwould nevertheless be presented to the jury.
When attempting to draw scientific conclusions,
whether at the laboratory bench or the courtroom bar,
one should at a minimum be required to formulate those
conclusions in accord with the scientific method. That
method provides a straightforward, relatively simple, and
reasonable test for the admissibility of expert opinion.
It is a test, moreover, which federal judges can readily
apply, and which, in cases like this, would enable them
to unearth the fallacies in unsound scientific evidence.
It does not require the court to make value judgments
about the legitimacy of the results, or to reject novel scientific conclusions merely because they are novel. Rather,
it provides the court with guidance for measuring
proffered evidence against a time-honored threshold, a
threshold which simultaneously promotes novelty and
reliability.
In sum, a.mici submit that the gateways reaffirmed by
the Federal Rules of Evidence in effect incorporate the
scientific method, and that -the Frye test represents one
appropriate way of adapting the scientific method to the
courtroom setting.
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CONCLUSION

Petitioners' expert testimony was properly excluded.
The judgment below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Of Counsel
PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
LAW CENTER

600 New Jersey Ave., N.W .
Wmihington, D.C. 20001
( 202) 662-9094
RICHARD DUESENBERG
MONSANTO COMPANY FOR
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE

800 North Lindbergh Boulevard
St. Louis, Missouri 63167
<314) 694-2819
DAVID F. ZoLL
DONALD D . EVANS
CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION

2501 M Street, N .W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
< 202) 887-1350
JANS. AMUNDSON
:N'A'!WNAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS

rn:n Pennsylvania Ave .. N.W.
Suite 1500
Washington, D.C . 20004-1703
(202) 637-3055
EDWARD P . Goon
PRODUCT LIABll..ITY ADVISORY
COUNCll.., INC.

7430 Second Ave ., Suite' 300
D(•t:-oit. Michigan 48202
r :n3) 872-4311

VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ *
ROBERT P. CHARROW
SCO'l"l' L. WINKELMAN
EDWARD C. Wu
CROWELL & MORING

1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-2505
( 202) 624-2500
* Counsel of Record

